We introduce the notion of adaptive trapdoor functions (ATDFs); roughly, ATDFs remain one-way even when the adversary is given access to an inversion oracle. Our main application is the black-box construction of chosenciphertext secure public-key encryption (CCA-secure PKE). Namely, we give a black-box construction of CCA-Secure PKE from ATDFs, as well as a construction of ATDFs from correlation-secure TDFs introduced by Rosen and Segev (TCC '09). Moreover, by an extension of a recent result of Vahlis (TCC '10), we show that ATDFs are strictly weaker than the latter (in a black-box sense). Thus, adaptivity appears to be the weakest condition on a TDF currently known to yield the first implication.
Introduction
Historically, the notion of one-way trapdoor functions (OW-TDFs) has played a central role in the study of cryptographic protocols, in particular for semanticallysecure public-key encryption (PKE); see e.g. [23, 40, 4] . However, it is well-known that semantic security alone is not sufficient in many applications; rather, encryption must be secure against active adversaries, say, who can inject packets into the network and observe decryptions or actions taken based on them. As a result, resistance to so-called chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) [36] has become the "gold standard" for security of PKE.
But, whereas there is a simple, black-box construction of semantically secure PKE from OW-TDFs [22] , the same is not true of CCA-secure PKE. Instead, early constructions were based on generic non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [32] . This calls into question the applicability of the TDF concept in the design of CCA-secure PKE. Indeed, the most successful approach for designing practical CCA-secure PKE schemes so far has been based on specific number theoretic assumptions (e.g., [18, 24] ) and algebraic primitives such as hash proof systems [17] or algebraic set systems [16] , which bypass TDFs. However, Peikert and Waters [35] , and subsequently Rosen and Segev [37] , recently introduced novel strengthenings to the notion of OW-TDFs and showed that these do imply simple, black-box constructions of CCA-secure PKE.
Still, we find an underlying "theory" of such stronger TDFs and their relation to CCA-secure PKE lacking. To this end we put forth a notion of adaptive trapdoor functions and study its relations to CCA-secure PKE. Surprisingly, we find that adaptivity, a seemingly fundamental notion in the context of chosenciphertext security, serves to weaken the assumptions on a TDF needed to imply black-box CCA-secure PKE, as well as to unify and clarify the schemes of [35, 37] . Moreover, it leads to new ones, realized from assumptions not known to imply the notions of [35, 37] .
Our Contributions
Adaptive trapdoor functions. The central notion we introduce are adaptive trapdoor functions (ATDFs). Loosely speaking, ATDFs remain one-way even when the adversary is given access to an inversion oracle, which it may query on points other than its challenge. We also introduce a natural extension we call tag-based adaptive trapdoor functions (TB-ATDFs), which in addition to the normal input also take a tag. For TB-ATDFs, the adversary may query its oracle on any point, but on a tag other than the challenge one. These notions are quite simple and intuitive but to the best of our knowledge have not appeared before. (There have, however, been similar notions that we discuss later.)
CCA-Secure PKE from ATDFs. As our first result, we give black-box constructions of CCA-secure PKE from both ATDFs and TB-ATDFs. While constructing CCA-secure PKE from TB-ATDFs is straightforward, constructing the former from ATDFs turns out to be more subtle. We apply the classical construction of one-bit PKE using the hardcore bit of the ATDF [8] , but it is important here that the ciphertext not contain the message xor'ed with the latter; rather the message is encrypted as the hardcore bit itself. By a recent result of Myers and Shelat [30] , this construction implies a black-box many-bit scheme as well. On the other hand, hybrid encryption permits a much more efficient direct construction of such a scheme in the case that the ATDF is a permutation or has linearly many simultaneous hardcore bits.
Construction of ATDFs.
In the random oracle model [6] , the notions of ATDF and TDF are equivalent.
1 To construct ATDFs in the standard model, we examine the relation of ATDFs and TB-ATDFs to the recently-introduced notions of correlated-product TDFs (CP-TDFs) [37] and lossy TDFs (LTDFs) [35] .
Intuitively, CP-TDFs remain one-way even if the adversary sees many independent instances of the TDF evaluated on the same input, and LTDFs are TDFs whose description is indistinguishable from that of a function that loses information about its input (i.e., has a bounded range). Inspired by the constructions of CCA-secure PKE in [35, 37] (which are based on earlier work by Dolev et al. [19] ), we show simple, black-box constructions of both ATDFs and TB-ATDFs from CP-TDFs. Since as shown in [37] , LTDFs imply the latter, 2 this also gives us ATDFs and TB-ATDFs from LTDFs. However, we show that ATDFs and TBATDFs allow much more efficient direct constructions using an all-but-one TDF (ABO-TDF) [35] as well.
Notably, when we apply our general construction of CCA-secure PKE to our constructions of TB-ATDFs from CP-TDFs and lossy+ABO-TDFs, what we obtain are precisely CCA-secure PKE schemes of [37] and [35] , respectively. This means that these works were implicitly constructing TB-ATDFs, and that the latter "abstracts out" a particular aspect of their constructions not formalized before. This unifies and clarifies their schemes from a conceptual standpoint and also leads to optimized constructions.
A black-box separation. Very recently, Vahlis [39] showed that there is no black-box construction of CP-TDFs from OW-TDFs. We observe here that his result extends to rule out a black-box construction of the former from ATDFs as well, by using the same "breaking" oracle. (This does not immediately rule out a black-box construction of CP-TDFs from TB-ATDFs, but we also rule this out by giving a construction of TB-TDFs from exponentially-hard ATDFs; the latter is separated from CP-TDFs by our extension of Vahlis's result as well.) Combined with the above-mentioned constructions, this means that, surprisingly, ATDFs and TB-ATDFs are strictly weaker than CP-TDFs and LTDFs. The relations between the different primitives are pictured in Figure 1 . The figure also contains some related existing notions discussed below.
TB-ATDF from II-RSA. Finally, we show that TB-ATDFs are realizable from specific assumptions not known to imply CP-TDFs. Namely, we consider the "instance-independent" RSA assumption (II-RSA) introduced (in a more general form) by Paillier and Villar [33] . Roughly, our assumption says that solving an RSA challenge y = x e mod N remains hard even when the adversary is given access to an inversion oracle that on input (y ′ , e ′ ) returns y ′1/e ′ mod N , where e = e ′ are primes. We show that II-RSA gives rise to a TB-ATDF. This also leads to a very efficient CCA-secure RSA-based PKE scheme in the standard model (though based on an interactive, non-standard assumption). [3] Fig. 1 . Relations between the various security notions on trapdoor functions and CCA-secure PKE, centered around our new notion of adaptive trapdoor functions (ATDF). → is an implication while → is a black-box separation. Dashed lines indicate trivial implications mentioned in the introduction. The considered security notions for TDFs are: extractable TDF (EX-TDF), lossy TDF, correlated-product TDF (CP-TDF), one-more TDF (OM-TDF), one-way TDF (OW-TDF), and CCA-secure deterministic PKE.
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Related Work
Related notions. Pandey et al. [34] introduced a notion they called "adaptive one-way functions," although their notion would be more accurately referred to as adaptive tag-based one-way functions. Besides the obvious difference of not having a trapdoor (the inversion oracle in their security experiment is unbounded), their notion differs from ours in that it does not have a public key. This is crucial for the applications of [34] to non-malleable commitment but also makes it much harder to construct. Indeed, they are not known to be realizable based on any standard assumptions.
Bellare et al. [5] made an earlier "adaptive assumption" on RSA, namely the One-More RSA assumption. A straightforward formalization of this security property to "one-more TDFs" (OM-TDFs) 3 yields a weaker primitive than ATDFs. In particular, it seems difficult based on the state-of-the-art to give a black-box construction of CCA-secure PKE (or ATDFs) from OM-TDFs. In [12] , Canetti and Dakdouk define the notion of extractable trapdoor functions (EXTDFs), which essentially says that no efficient adversary can compute f (x) without "knowing" x (similar to the notion of plaintext-awareness for PKE [7] ). This notion implies ATDFs but unfortunately no instantiation of EX-TDFs based on standard assumption is known (the authors only provide constructions of extractable one-way functions, without a trapdoor).
In another line of work with very different motivation, Bellare et al. [2] introduced a strengthening to OW-TDF they called "deterministic encryption", which includes a CCA-secure variant. CCA-secure deterministic encryption (secure for encrypting a single message) can be viewed as a strengthening of ATDFs that additionally hides all partial information and allows for high-entropy input. CCA-secure deterministic encryption was constructed from CPA-secure PKE (satisfying a minor technical condition) in the random oracle model in [2] and in the standard model from LTDFs in [9] . We note that [3] gave a direct construction of CCA-secure PKE from CCA-secure deterministic encryption.
In the randomized encryption context, we mention the related notion of tagbased encryption [27, 1, 26] . Indeed, TB-ATDF can be viewed an analogue of selective-tag weakly CCA-secure PKE [26] in the TDF context. We also point out that the related notion of "one-way CCA" for encryption has surfaced before; see, e.g., [33] . (We stress that the difference is not just conceptual, as this notion is for randomized encryption.)
Work on black-box constructions. The importance of giving black-box constructions in cryptography is well-understood. A complementary line of work, starting with the seminal paper of Impagliazzo and Rudich [25] , seeks to understand the limitations of such constructions. In the context of PKE, Choi et al. [14] recently showed a black-box construction of a non-malleable (i.e. NM-CPA) PKE scheme from any semantically-secure (i.e. IND-CPA) one, whereas [21] showed that there is no such construction of CCA-secure PKE whose decryption algorithm does not call the encryption algorithm of the starting scheme. In fact, CCA-secure PKE seems to be the remaining fundamental cryptographic task for which we know a non-black-box construction (from "enhanced" OW-TDPs) but not a corresponding black-box one. We hope that our work brings us closer to this goal.
Open Problems
Our works raises a number of interesting open problems. It may be interesting to consider other natural security notions for TDFs (e.g., non-malleability or q-bounded adaptivity [15] ) and study their instantiation from standard assumptions, their implications for PKE, as well as their relation to existing notions from Figure 1 . Furthermore, some of the relations in Figure 1 , in particular between TDFs and ATDFs, are open.
Lossy TDFs are only known to be instantiable from decisional assumptions (such as DDH and QR), whereas we show that ATDFs are also instantiable from a computational assumption (though a non-standard and interactive one, namely II-RSA). An interesting open question is whether it is possible to instantiate ATDFs from more standard computational assumptions (such as RSA or CDH). One could also try to define a different security notion for TDFs, weaker than adaptivity, that admits instantiations from standard computational assumptions but still suffices for black-box CCA-secure PKE.
Finally, we are optimistic that ATDFs may be useful in the general context of black-box constructions of cryptograhpic primitives secure against adaptive attacks.
Preliminaries
Notation. If x and y are (binary) strings, then x y denotes an encoding from which they are uniquely recoverable. If k ∈ N then 1 k denotes the string of k ones. If S is a set then s $ ← S denotes the operation of picking an element s of S uniformly at random. We write A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm (i.e., a Turing Machine) with inputs x, y, . . . and by z $ ← A(x, y, . . .) we denote the operation of running A with inputs (x, y, . . .) and letting z be the output. We write A O1,O2,... (x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is an algorithm with inputs x, y, . . . and access to oracles O 1 , O 2 , . . .. With PT we denote polynomial time and with PPT we denote probabilistic polynomial time.
CCA-secure PKE. A public key encryption scheme PKE = (Kg, Enc, Dec) with message space MsgSp = MsgSp(k) consists of three PT algorithms, of which the first two, Kg and Enc, are probabilistic and the last one, Dec, is deterministic. Public/secret keys for security parameter k ∈ N are generated using (pk, sk)
Given such a key pair, a message m ∈ MsgSp is encrypted via c $ ← Enc(pk, m); a ciphertext is decrypted by m ← Dec(sk, c). For correctness, we require that for all k ∈ N, all messages m ∈ MsgSp, it must hold that Pr[Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) = m] = 1, where the probability is taken over the above randomized algorithms and (pk, sk) $ ← Kg(1 k ). Let A be an adversary against PKE and define its IND-CCA-advantage as
where O(sk, c) = Dec(sk, c), and in the second phase ("guess phase") A is not allowed to query O(sk, ·) for the challenge ciphertext c * . We also require that m 0 and m 1 are of the same length. (Here st is some arbitrary state information.) We say that PKE is IND-CCA-secure if Adv 
Adaptive Trapdoor Functions
Trapdoor Functions. Recall that a trapdoor function (TDF) is a triple of algorithms, where Tdg is probabilistic and on input 1 k generates an evaluation/trapdoor key-pair (ek , td )
Here we require TDFs to be injective. (Following [4] , however, one can extend our results to poly-to-one TDFs as well.) Note that the above definition is purely functional and does not impose any security requirement.
One-wayness. First we recall the standard notion of one-wayness for trapdoor functions. Let A be an inverter and define its OW-advantage against TDF as
Trapdoor function TDF is one-way if Adv ow TDF,A (·) is negligible for every PPT inverter A.
Adaptive one-wayness. Intuitively, adaptivity means that one-wayness holds even when the adversary may query an inverse oracle on points other than its challenge. Let TDF = (Tdg, F, F −1 ) be a trapdoor function. Let A be an inverter and define its AOW-advantage against TDF as
where we demand that A does not query y to its oracle. Note that the behavior of oracle when queried on a y ′ outside the range of F(td , ·) is undefined; it returns whatever F −1 (td , y ′ ) does in this case (typically ⊥). We say that TDF is adaptive one-way (or simply adaptive) if Adv atdf TDF,A (·) is negligible for every such PPT inverter A.
Tag-based adaptive one-wayness. A tag-based TDF is a triple of algorithms TDF tag = (Tdg tag , F tag , F −1 tag ) with associated tag-space TagSp(k), where Tdg tag is probabilistic and on input 1 k generates an evaluation/trapdoor key-
be an inverter and define its TB-AOW-advantage against TDF tag as
where we demand that A 2 does not make a query of the form F −1 tag (td, t, ·) to its oracle. We say that TDF tag is tag-based adaptive one-way if Adv
tb-atdf
TDFtag ,A (·) is negligible for every such PPT inverter A.
In the above experiment the "challenge tag" t is independent of ek and hence it may also be called selective-tag security (similar to selective-ID security for IBE schemes). Stronger variants of this security notion can be obtained by allowing the adversary choose the challenge-tag t adaptively.
We note that typically one requires the size of the tag-space to be superpolynomial. In fact, TB-ATDFs with polynomial-size tag-space can be constructed from any OW-TDF, but are not sufficient for our applications.
Relations between ATDFs and TB-ATDFs. Note that tag-based TDFs can be viewed as a specific type of TDF in which the first part of the input is output in the clear. Using this observation, it is not difficult to show that ATDFs and TB-ATDFs are equivalent under exponential hardness, meaning that if we start with an exponentially-hard version of one primitive it implies an exponentially-hard version of the other; see the full version for details. It is an open question whether ATDFs and TB-ATDFs are equivalent in general.
CCA-Secure PKE from ATDFs
Construction from ATDFs. We show how to construct a one-bit CCA-secure PKE scheme from an ATDF. By a recent result of Myers and Shelat [30] , this implies a black-box construction of a many-bit scheme as well.
Let TDF = (Tdg, F, F −1 ) be a TDF and hc(·) be a hardcore bit, for example the Goldreich-Levin bit [22] . We construct PKE scheme PKE[TDF] = (Kg, Enc, Dec) with message-space {0, 1} as follows:
• Key Generation: On input 1 k , run (ek , td ) $ ← Tdg and return (ek , td).
• Encryption: On input ek , m, where m ∈ {0, 1} do:
• Decryption: On inputs td and c = c 1 flag, if flag = 1 then return c 1 , else return hc(F −1 (td , c 1 )).
It is clear that the above construction satisfies correctness. (Note that if the encryption algorithm happens to output the message in the clear it is still correctly decrypted, so this is a security, not a functionality, concern.) We now turn to security.
Theorem 1.
If TDF is adaptive one-way, then the PKE[TDF] defined above is IND-CCA-secure.
The proof reduces IND-CCA security of the scheme to security of a hardcore bit by turning an adversary against the former into a distinguisher for the hardcore bit that is given k independent samples, and then applying a hybrid argument.
We note that as a consequence, security of the scheme is only loosely related to security of the underlying hardcore bit (losing a factor 1/k).
Proof (of Theorem 1).
Given an adversary A against the PKE scheme, we transform its IND-CCA experiment via a sequence of games:
-Game G 1 : The IND-CCA experiment.
-Game G 2 : Instead of computing the hardcore bits using hc(·), the encryption algorithm encrypts the challenge message by picking a uniformly random bit on each iteration of the for-loop. That is, the second line in the for-loop is replaced with "h $ ← {0, 1}." -Game G 3 : If the for-loop in the encryption algorithm completes its execution (without satisfying the h = m condition), instead of returning the challenge message in the clear, it simply returns ⊥ to the adversary. That is, the last line in the encryption algorithm is replaced with "Return ⊥."
denote the probability that A outputs the challenge bit b when executed in Game G i (taken over the coins of the game and of A).
We first claim that if there is an inverter A against TDF such that Pr[
To show this, it suffices by a standard hybrid argument and security of hc(·) to give a k-sample distinguisher D against hc(·) whose advantage is non-negligible in this case. That is, D is given an input ek , (y 1 , h 1 ), . . . , (y k , h k ) where y i = F(ek , x i ) and either h i = hc(x i ) or is a uniformly random bit for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k; D also has oracle access to F −1 (td , ·), which it may query on any y such that y = y i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Define D on inputs ek , (y 1 , h 1 ), . . . , (y k , h k ) as follows: To show that D has the claimed property, note that the only way it can fail to give a perfect simulation of either Game G 1 or G 2 is if A makes a query of the form y i 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k. It suffices to bound the probability of this when A is executed as in Game G 1 , as follows. In the case c * = y i * 0, A does not query y i * 0 by definition, and the probability it queries y i 0 for any i = i * is at most (k − 1)q/2 k−1 (where q an upper-bound on its number of decryption queries), where we use the fact that conditioning on hc(x i ) = 1 − m b reduces the minentropy of each x i by at most 1 bit and F(ek , ·) is an injection. A similar analysis pertains to the case c * = m b 0. Overall, the probability is at most kq/2 k−1 . We next claim that Pr[
This follows by using the fact that in Game G 2 the hardcore bits used to encrypt the challenge message have been replaced with uniformly random ones. Construction from TB-ATDF. Our construction of CCA-secure PKE from a TB-ATDF is much simpler. It additionally makes use of a strongly one-time unforgeable signature scheme (see e.g. [37] for the definition). For simplicity, we give the construction below for the case of 1-bit messages. It is easy to extend it to a many-bit scheme, essentially by concatenating many applications of the TB-ATDF under independent inputs but the same tag.
Let TDF tag = (Tdg tag , F tag , F −1 tag ) be a tag-based TDF and let hc(·) be a hardcore bit. Let OTS = (K, S, V) be a signature scheme whose verification keys are contained in the tag-space of TDF tag . We construct PKE scheme PKE[TDF tag , OTS] = (Kg, Enc, Dec) with message-space {0, 1} as follows:
• Key Generation: On input 1 k , run (ek , td) $ ← Tdg tag and return (ek , td ).
• Encryption: On input ek , m where m ∈ {0, 1}, run (sk, vk)
and y 2 ← hc(x) ⊕ m; also, set σ ← S(sk, y 1 y 2 ). Return y 1 y 2 vk σ.
• Decryption: On inputs td and y = y 1 y 2 vk σ, if V(vk, σ) = 1 then set x ← TDF tag (td , vk, y 1 ) and return hc(x) ⊕ y 2 ; , otherwise return ⊥.
We have the following theorem. The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
Optimizations. Our construction of CCA-secure PKE from ATDFs can be simplified and made much more efficient if the given ATDF is a permutation or has linearly many simultaneous hardcore bits. Namely, in this case one can use the ATDF as a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) for an IND-CCA-secure symmetric encryption scheme. Additionally, for some specific hardcore bits one may be able to sample uniformly from the set {x ∈ {0, 1} k | hc(x) = b} more efficiently than by repeated sampling of the uniform distribution on {0, 1} k . (Indeed, this is the case for the universally-hardcore Goldreich-Levin bit [22] .) This translates to a corresponding efficiency improvement in the scheme.
Our construction of CCA-secure PKE from TB-ATDFs can also be made much more efficient if the given TB-ATDF is a permutation (for every tag) or has linearly many simultaneous hardcore bits. The idea is to first construct a selective-tag weakly CCA secure tag-PKE scheme in the sense of [26] by using the TB-ATDF as a KEM for a one-time CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme. Then, as shown in [26] , we can apply the transform of Boneh et al. [10] to obtain a CCA-secure PKE scheme, which uses only symmetric-key primitives.
Inspired by the constructions of CCA-secure PKE in [35, 37] , we show that both ATDFs and TB-ATDFs can be constructed in a simple black-box manner from correlated-product TDFs [37] . As shown in [37] , lossy TDFs (LTDFs) [35] imply CP-TDFs, thus by our result above they imply ATDFs and TB-ATDFs too. However, we are able to give much more efficient direct construction in combination with an all-but-one TDF (ABO-TDF) as defined by [35] .
Constructions from Correlated-Product TDFs
One-wayness under correlated-product. We first recall the notion of onewayness under correlated product [37] . Let TDF = (Tdg, F, F −1 ) be a trapdoor function, and let C t be such that C t (1 k ) is distributed over {0, 1} tk for a polynomial t = t(k). Let A be an inverter and define its C t -CP-advantage against TDF as
We say that TDF one-way under C t -correlated-product if Adv cpow TDF,A (·) is negligible for any PPT inverter A.
The cannonical C t considered by [37] is such that x 1 = x 2 = . . . = x t , where x 1 is random. We call TDFs secure in this sense one-way under t-correlatedproduct (t-CP-TDF).
Construction of ATDFs
1 ) be a TDF, where we assume wlog (by suitable padding) that TDF 1 (ek , ·) has a fixed output length n = n(k). We construct TDF = (Tdg, F, F −1 ) as follows:
where b i denotes the ith bit of F(ek 0 , x) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Inversion: On inputs td and y = y 0 y 1 . . . y n , let Proof. Given an adversary A against TDF, we describe below an adversary B against TDF 1 such that Adv On inputs ek 1 , . . . , ek n+1 , y where y = (F 1 (ek 1 , x 1 ) , . . . , F 1 (ek n+1 , x n+1 )), B sets ek 0 ← ek 1 and ek bi i ← ek i+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where b i denotes the ith bit of F 1 (ek 1 , x 1 ). It then chooses (ek 
It is clear that B satisfies the desired property. To finish the proof it remains to argue that index i used in answering A's inversion queries always exists. But this follows directly from injectivity of F(ek 0 , ·) and the fact that A is not allowed to make an inversion query equal to its challenge.
Remarks. We note that it is possible to make the scheme more efficient by additionally using a universal one-way family (aka. TCR) of hash functions [31] . Then, the "selector" bits b 1 , . . . , b n in the construction are replaced with the bits of the hash of F(ek 0 , x). We also note that following [37] it is possible to give a construction based on a CP-TDF allowing a slightly weaker correlation among the inputs.
Construction of TB-ATDFs. The above construction of ATDFs can easily be modified to give a construction of TB-ATDFs as well. The difference is that in the "selector" bits b 1 , . . . , b n are replaced with the bits t 1 , . . . , t n of the tag t. Notably, when we apply our construction of CCA-secure PKE from TB-ATDFs given in Section 3) to the resulting TB-ATDF, we obtain precisely the CCAsecure PKE scheme of [37] .
Constructions from Lossy and All-but-One TDFs
We first recall the notion of lossy TDFs and their generalization called all-butone TDFs from [35] .
Lossy TDFs. A (k, ℓ)-LTDF is a quadruple LTDF = (LTdg, LTdg ′ , LF, LF −1 ) of algorithms, where the triple (LTdg, LF, LF −1 ) is a TDF on {0, 1} k . We require that (1) the function LTDF(ek ′ , ·) has a range of size at most 2 ℓ (where ℓ = ℓ(k)) for every ek ′ , and (2) the keys ek , ek ′ are computationally indistinguishable, over the choice of (ek , td)
All-but-one TDFs. An (k, ℓ)-ABO-TDF with branch-space {0, 1} n=n(k) is a triple ABO = (ABO-Tdg, ABO-F, ABO-F −1 ) of algorithms, where for every r = r ′ ∈ {0, 1} n , the triple (ABO-Tdg(1
k (the "lossy branch" r is passed as an input to ABO-Tdg). We further require (1) for every r ∈ {0, 1} n and ek ′ , the function ABO-F(r, ek ′ , ·) has range-size at most 2 ℓ (where ℓ = ℓ(k)), and (3) for every r = r ′ ∈ {0, 1} n , the keys ek 1 , ek 2 are computationally indistinguishable, over (ek 1 , td 1 )
and (ek 2 , td 2 )
Construction of ATDFs. Our construction simplifies the construction of CCA-secure deterministic encryption given in [9] . Let LTDF = (LTdg, LTdg ′ , LF, LF −1 ) be a (k, ℓ 1 )-LTDF and let ABO = (ABO-Tdg, ABO-F, ABO-F −1 ) be a (k, ℓ 2 )-ABO-TDF; for simplicity we assume its branch-space is {0, 1} n for n = n(k). Let T : R → ({0, 1}
n \ {0 n }) be a hash function, where R denotes the range of LF(ek , ·). We construct TDF[LTDF, ABO, T ] as follows.
• Key Generation: On input 1 k , run (ek ltf , td ltf )
Return ((ek ltf , ek abo ), (td ltf , td abo )).
• Evaluation: On inputs (ek ltf , ek abo ) and x ∈ {0, 1} k , set y 1 ← LF(ek ltf , x) and y 2 ← ABO-F(T (y 1 ), ek abo , x). Return y 1 y 2 .
• Inversion: On inputs (td ltf , td abo ) and y = y 1 y 2 , set x ← LF −1 (td , y 1 ). If y 2 = ABO-F(T (y 1 ), ek abo , x) then return x, otherwise return ⊥.
We have the following theorem. The proof follows [35] and is given in the full version.
Construction of TB-ATDFs. Similarly to our construction of ATDF from CP-TDF, the above construction can be adapted to construct a tag-based ATDF instead. The difference is that in the evaluation algorithm, instead of evaluating the all-but-one TDF at branch T (y 1 ), it is evaluated at branch t, where the latter is the input tag. As before, when we apply our general construction of CCAsecure PKE from TB-ADTFs given in Section 3 to the resulting TB-ATDF, we obtain precisely the CCA-secure PKE scheme of [35] .
On the Complexity of Adaptive TDFs
In this section, we show that there is no black-box construction of CP-TDFs from either ATDFs or TB-ATDFs; combined with the results of Section 4, this shows that the latter are (surprisingly) strictly weaker primitives (in a black-box sense). We then show that TB-ATDFs can be realized based on an assumption on RSA inversion not known to imply CP-TDFs.
A Black-Box Separation
Very recently, Vahlis [39] showed that there is no black-box construction of CPTDFs from one-way TDFs. We observe here that his proof extends to rule out a black-box construction of CP-TDFs from either ATDFs or TB-ATDFs.
Theorem 5. There is no black-box construction of CP-TDFs from ATDFs or TB-ATDFs.
The theorem actually follows by extending Vahlis's proof to rule out a blackbox construction of CP-TDFs from exponentially-hard ATDFs. Since as discussed in Section 3, TB-ATDFs are implied by exponentially-hard TDFs, this rules out a black-box construction of CP-TDFs from TB-ATDFs as well.
Since Vahlis's proof is rather technical we avoid explaining its details here. Instead, we describe the high-level ideas and point out a minor change needed to give our claimed result.
Similar to most black-box separation results, in order to show that there is no black-box construction of primitive P 1 from primitive P 2 , the proof starts by defining an ideal oracle O (the ideal version of P 2 ), and a break oracle B. One then shows that (i) there exist an adversary A that breaks any construction of P 1 , with the help of a small number of queries to B and (ii) P 2 can be securely realized using the ideal oracle O, even when the adversary is given access to B.
Oracle O. The ideal oracle O is essentially an ideal trapdoor permutation (as described in several previous works [20] ). Roughly speaking, O is defined as a triple of functions (g, e, d) sampled uniformly at random from the set of all functions with the following property: g maps trapdoors to public keys; e(pub, ·) is an independent permutation for every public key pub, and d(pri, ·) inverts e(pub, ·) if pri is the trapdoor corresponding to pub. One may assume that trapdoors, public keys, and inputs are all of the same length, i.e. equal to the security parameter. Also note that there is no need to explicitly define d as it is determined given the definitions of g and e.
It is easy to see that oracle O is an ATDF; in fact, it is an exponentiallyhard ATDF. However, as pointed out in [39] , O is also correlation secure as the permutations for every public key is chosen independently and uniformly at random.
oracle B. Oracle B is specially designed to break the security of a CP-TDF. It takes as input a triple of circuits (G O , E O , D O ) which are candidates for a correlation secure TDF, two public keys PUB 1 , PUB 2 and the values E(PUB 1 , x) and E(PUB 2 , x). The naive solution would be to let oracle B return x. However, this would make oracle B too powerful and would allow an adversary to break the security of any ideal TDF by letting the two public keys be pub 1 = pub 2 . This problem is solved by requiring that the public keys of O encoded in PUB 1 are distinct from those encoded in PUB 2 . An additional problem is caused by the fact that the adversary can make queries that contain invalid public keys, while detecting invalid keys by oracle B can render it too powerful. This issue is resolved by requiring the adversary to provide a partial oracle
′ ) that is defined on a small part of the domain of (g, e, d) such that relative to O ′ , PUB 1 and PUB 2 are valid public keys.
We refer the reader to [39] for a more formal description of oracles O and B. The following claims (proven in [39] ), complete the argument.
Claim 1. ([39])
There exist an adversary that only makes polynomially many queries (in the security parameter) to oracles O and B, and breaks the security of any CP-TDF function with non-negligible probability. In [39] , Claim 2 is proven for the case when A is playing the OW-TDF game. However, the proof easily extends to the case of adaptive TDFs. Particularly, the bulk of the proof consists of describing a simulator S that simulates the answers for queries made to oracle B. For consistency purposes, S keeps a list O * of all the query/answers made to the challenge function e(pub * , ·) where pub * is the challenge public key. In case of ATDFs, S needs to do the same for any query e −1 (pub * , ·) made to the inversion oracle. The rest of the proof stays the same. Note that, in the above discussion, we did not restrict the running time of the adversaries. Instead, we only required that the number of queries they make to the oracles is small. It is however easy to bring things to the world of polynomial-time adversaries by giving everyone access to a PSPACE oracle (see [25] ).
Tag-based ATDF from an Assumption on RSA Inversion
To further demonstrate the usefulness of our new notions, we show that TBATDFs are realizable from an assumption on RSA inversion not known to imply a CP-TDF.
Instance-independent RSA [33, 13] . The instance-independent RSA assumption (II-RSA) speaks to the difficulty of solving the RSA problem -that is, computing e-th roots modulo N = pq -even if given access to an oracle that computes e ′ -th roots modulo N for e ′ = e. Of course, some additional restriction on the exponents is necessary for this assumption to hold; in what follows we require that e, e ′ are primes. To define the assumption formally, let the tuple of algorithms (RSA g , RSA, RSA −1 ) be defined in the natural way with the exception that the exponent e is no longer generated by the key generation step. That is, on input 1 k , algorithm RSA g generates (ek , td ) where ek = N = pq, and td = (p, q) for two uniformly chosen k/2-bit primes p, q. Moreover, we require p, q to be safe primes, meaning (p − 1)/2, (q − 1)/2 are also prime. On inputs e ∈ Z * where here and in what follows P n denotes the set of all n-bit primes and we require that A 2 only makes queries of the form RSA −1 (td , e ′ , y ′ ) for primes e ′ = e.
